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ICSID Arbitration Proceedings: Practical
Aspects
Georges R. Delaumet
The caseload of the International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID) has significantly and steadily in-
creased in the last few years. In contrast with the lean years be-
tween the creation of ICSID in 1966, and 1981, during which
only nine disputes were submitted to ICSID arbitration, thirteen
new proceedings have been instituted since 1982.2 Two of these
proceedings relate to conciliation and one to the annulment of
an award.3 At the time of this writing, ten proceedings are pend-
ing. Of the twelve proceedings that have been terminated, only
five have resulted in awards; seven were either discontinued or
amicably settled."
Certain awards have been published,' and comments on
t Senior Legal Adviser, International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID), Washington, D.C. The views expressed in this Article are those of the author
and do not necessarily represent those of ICSID.
1. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Na-
tionals of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, T.I.A.S. No. 6090, 575 U.N.T.S.
159, which created ICSID, came into force on October 14, 1966.
2. Current information on the status of ICSID cases is provided in NEws FROM IC-
SID, a semi-annual publication which began in early 1984. This free publication can be
obtained on request addressed to: International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes, 1818 H Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20433, Telephone: (202) 477-4943. A
new brochure entitled ICSID cases: 1972-1984 that consolidates information on the cases
will be issued soon as Document ICSID/16.
3. One conciliation case was settled amicably before the conciliation commission was
constituted. The other proceeding is pending. The annulment proceeding is also pending.
See NEws PROM ICSID, Winter 1985, at 2.
4. The high proportion of settlements is a characterisitic feature of ICSID. The Re-
vised Arbitration Rules are intended to facilitate the amicable settlement of investment
disputes submitted to ICSID. See infra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
5. See AGIP S.P.A. v. People's Republic of the Congo, 64 RlwsrA DI DIRrrro INTER-
NAZIONALE 863 (1981) (French original), 21 I.L.M. 726 (1982) (English translation), 8 Y.B.
COM. ARB. 133 (ICCA) (1983) (English translation); Soci6t6 Ltd. Benvenuti & Bonfant
srl. v. People's Republic of the Congo, 21 I.L.M. 740 (1982), with a correction in 21
I.L.M. 1478 (1982) (English translation from the French original); Amco-Asia v. Republic
of Indonesia, 23 I.L.M. 351 (1984); Kl6ckner Industrie Anlagen GmbH v. United Repub-
1
PACE LAW REVIEW
them as well as on other ICSID proceedings that have not been
the object of full publication, have appeared.6 Also, the Secreta-
riat of ICSID, as part of its promotional activities, has released
information available to it that is not confidential. 7
As a result of these developments, a number of issues relat-
ing to the effective and potential use of ICSID can be identified.
In addition to such basic issues of substance as those dealing
with the basic requirements that must be satisfied before inter-
ested parties can make use of ICSID arbitration, issues of appli-
cable law, those relating to the drafting of ICSID clauses, or the
increasing reference to ICSID in bilateral investment treaties,
which have been the object of an abundant literature,8 the in-
creasing number of ICSID proceedings makes it possible to con-
sider in greater detail issues pertaining to the administration of
ICSID proceedings and their outcome.
It is well known that the administration entrusted to the
Secretariat and to arbitral tribunals, takes place in the context
of self-contained international rules that are found in the ICSID
Convention and in the Regulations and Rules adopted for its im-
plementation. What is less known, however, is how these rules
are applied by the Secretariat and arbitral tribunals in concrete
cases submitted to ICSID. Thus, it is interesting to take stock of
a number of issues that have arisen in the context of what may
broadly be called the "internal" administration of ICSID pro-
lic of Cameroon and Soci6t6 Camerounaise des Engrais (SOCAME), reproduced in part
in Paulsson, The ICSID Klckner v. Cameroon Award: The Duties of Partners in North
South Economic Development Agreements, 1 J. INT'L ARB. 145 (1984). A summary of the
legal rules applied in the Amco-Asia and the Kldckner cases also appear in NEWS FROM
ICSID, Summer 1984, at 5-11.
6. Bernardini, Le Prime Esperienze Arbitrali del Centro Internazionale per il
Regolamento delle Controversia Relative ad Investimenti, Riv. DIR. INT. PRIV. E. PROC.
1981, at 29; Lalive, The First "World Bank" Arbitration (Holiday Inns v. Mo-
rocco) - Some Legal Problems, 51 BRir. Y. B. INT'L L. 123 (1980); Paulsson, supra note
5; Schmidt, Arbitration under the Auspices of the International Centre for Settlement
of Investment Disputes (ICSID): Implications of the Decision on Jurisdiction in Alcoa
Minerals of Jamaica, Inc. v. Government of Jamaica, 17 HARV. INT'L L.J. 90 (1976).
7. In addition to News from ICSID, the promotional activities of the Secretariat
include, inter alia, the organization of, and particiation in, colloquia and services, and the
publication of articles in law and business journals. ICSID has also published Model
Clauses, Document (ICSID/5/Rev. 1, July 7, 1981).
8. See generally the bibliography prepared by the Secretariat and issued as Docu-
ment ICSID/13.
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ceedings from the time of the institution of proceedings until the
termination of these proceedings. These issues will be discussed
in the first part of this Article.
These issues, however, or at least some of them cannot be
considered in isolation. Because it is self-contained, the ICSID
machinery has definite "external" consequences. Those concern
the restraint that should be exercised or the assistance that
should be given by the courts in Contracting States in the con-
text of ICSID proceedings.
In this connection, it should be recalled that under article
26 of the ICSID Convention: "Consent of the parties to arbitra-
tion under this Convention shall, unless otherwise stated, be
deemed consent to such arbitration to the exclusion of any other
remedy." By submitting to ICSID arbitration the parties have,
therefore, the assurance that action cannot be brought against
them in a non- ICSID forum such as a national court,10 and that
the ICSID proceedings will be free from any form of interference
or control by the courts of Contracting States. In other words, if
a party to an ICSID arbitration agreement attempts to circum-
vent the exclusive character of its consent by bringing a claim in
the courts of a Contracting State, the courts ought not to enter-
9. Pursuant to the second sentence of article 26 of the Convention, the rule formu-
lated in that provision is subject to one exception: as a condition of its consent to ICSID
arbitration, a Contracting State may require the exhaustion of local administrative or
judicial remedies.
So far, this exception has had little practical significance. None of the ICSID clauses
known to the Secretariat require exhaustion of local remedies. Likewise, investment laws
referring to ICSID as a means of settling investment disputes and the overwhelming
majority of bilateral investment protection treaties, with the exception of those con-
cluded by Romania, do not require exhaustion of local remedies. The Romanian treaties
all provide that a consent to ICSID arbitration is limited to issues of compensation fol-
lowing preliminary adjudication by the Romanian courts. 2 G. DELAUME, TRANSNATIONAL
CoNTRAcTs, §15.18 (Supp. 1982).
Israel is the only Contracting State which has made a declaration that it will require
the exhaustion of local administrative or judicial remedies. See Document ICSID/8-C, at
1.
For a discussion of article 26, in a Latin American context, see Shihata, ICSID and
Latin America, in NEWS FROM ICSID, Summer 1984, at 2.
10. Note also that article 27 of the Convention provides that when an investor and a
Contracting State have agreed to submit investment disputes to ICSID arbitration, the
State whose national is party to the agreement may not espouse the cause of its national,
give that national dipomatic protection, or bring an international claim in respect of the
dispute.
1985)
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tain the claim and should refer the parties to ICSID.
Another external consequence of the ICSID machinery is
the converse of the first one. Prevented from interfering with
ICSID proceedings, the courts in the Contracting States are
mandated to facilitate the recognition of ICSID awards. Subject
to further discussion, 2 it can be stated in general terms that the
recognition of ICSID awards is assured in all Contracting States
and that the effectiveness of ICSID awards exceeds by far that
of any other international award. These issues will be considered
in the second part of this Article.
By way of a final preliminary remark, it should be noted
that the ICSID Regulations and Rules have been revised re-
cently. The original Regulations and Rules had been issued in
January 1968. Except for minor amendments, they had re-
mained unchanged. In the light of ICSID's experience and the
increasing number of proceedings administered by it, it became
apparent that changes could usefully be made to clarify the lan-
guage of certain provisions and to introduce greater flexibility
into the administration of proceedings. On September 26, 1984,
the Administrative Council of ICSID adopted the Revised Regu-
lations and Rules submitted by the Secretary-General. s The
Regulations, which have an administrative character, came into
force upon approval. Pursuant to article 44 of the ICSID Con-
vention, 4 the Revised Arbitration Rules apply only prospec-
tively. However, according to the same provision, nothing pre-
vents the parties to a dispute submitted to ICSID under an
11. See infra notes 68-88 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
13. The Administrative and Financial Regulations, Rules of Procedure for the Insti-
tution of Conciliation and Arbitration Proceedings [hereinafter cited as Institution
Rules], Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings [hereinafter cited as Arbitration
Rules], and the Rules of Procedure for Conciliation Proceedings [hereinafter cited as
Conciliation Rules] are available as part of Document ICSID/15 (1985), on request ad-
dressed to the Secretariat.
14. Article 44 reads as follows:
Any arbitration proceeding shall be conducted in accordance with the provi-
sions of this Section and, except as the parties otherwise agree, in accordance with
the Arbitration Rules in effect on the date on which the parties consented to arbi-
tration. If any question of procedure arises which is not covered by this Section or
the Arbitration Rules or any rules agreed by the parties, the Tribunal shall decide
the question.
Convention, supra note 1, art. 44.
[Vol. 5:563
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earlier consent from agreeing to the application of the Revised
Rules. To avoid confusion, all references to the Regulations and
Rules should be read as referring to the 1984 revision, unless
otherwise indicated.
I. Internal Administration of ICSID Proceedings
A. Institution of the Proceeding; the "Screening Power" of the
Secretary- General
Proceedings are commenced by the filing of a request, which
must not only be supported by documentation, but must also be
sufficiently precise to show that the basic requirements of the
Convention are satisfied. 15 Pursuant to article 25 of the Conven-
tion, ICSID arbitration is open to the parties to investment dis-
putes provided that three basic conditions are fulfilled. First, the
parties must have agreed to submit their dispute to ICSID arbi-
tration. 16 Second, the dispute must be between a Contracting
State (or one of its subdivisions or agencies)17 and a "national"
of another Contracting State.' 8 Third, the dispute must be a le-
gal dispute,'9 arising directly out of an investment.2 0 In other
15. Institution Rule 2, supra note 13.
16. Consent may be recorded in an arbitration clause or any other agreement (in-
cluding an exchange of letters) in writing, Consent may also result from the acceptance
by an investor of a unilateral offer made by a Contracting State either in its investment
legislation or in a bilateral treaty with the Contracting State of which the investor is a
national. See Delaume, ICSID Arbitration: Practical Considerations, 1 J. INT'L ARB. 101,
104-08 (1984).
17. If the dispute involves a subdivision or agency of a Contracting State, that sub-
division or agency must have been designated to ICSID by the State concerned and the
consent of the entity involved must be approved by that State, unless it has notified
ICSID that no such approval was required. Convention, supra note 1, art. 25(1), (3). See
Delaume, supra note 16 at 109-111.
18. In practice, no dispute has involved natural persons. All proceedings have been
instituted by, or against, corporations. For a discussion of problems arising in connection
with the nationality of corporations, see infra text accompanying notes 27, 29, 50-51.
19. It is generally agreed that reference to the "legal" nature of a dispute limits the
scope of ICSID arbitration to a review of the respective rights and obligations of the
parties as set forth in an investment agreement, in light of the laws and regulations
relevant to that agreement. Examples of "legal disputes" are those concerning non-per-
formance, including causes of excuse based on force majeure or similar events, the viola-
tion of "stabilization" clauses, the interpretation of the agreement, including expropria-
tion or nationalization, and related issues of compensation. In contrast, disputes
regarding conflicts of interest between the parties, such as those involving the desirabil-
ity of renegotiating the entire agreement or certain of its terms, would normally fall
5
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words, the request must show that the dispute falls within the
"jurisdiction" of ICSID, s1 that it is within the scope of the
Convention.
Subject to meeting these conditions, the request does not
have to be drafted in any particular fashion. In practice, the re-
quests submitted to ICSID exhibit significant variations in re-
gard to the manner in which they are presented, their length
and the volume of the supporting documentation. In general
terms, the requests are substantially documented. Upon receipt
of the request, the Secretary-General sends an acknowledgement
to the requesting party and, upon payment of a $100 fee, trans-
mits a copy of the request and of the accompanying documenta-
tion to the other party.22
It is at this point in time that the Secretary-General must
exercise a unique prerogative, namely that of determining
whether he should register the request or refuse registration.
Under article 36(3) of the Convention, the Secretary-General is
given the right to refuse registration if "he finds, on the basis of
the information contained in the request, that the dispute is
manifestly outside the jurisdiction of the Centre."
This "screening power" was vested in the Secretary-
General:
With a view to avoiding the embarrassment to a party (par-
outside the scope of the Convention. The Convention also does not apply to factual dis-
putes, such as those concerning accounting or factfinding investigations. These disputes
may, however, be submitted to the Additional Facility administered by ICSID. See De-
laume, supra note 16, at 123-25. On September 26, 1984, the Administrative Council of
ICSID decided to continue the Additional Facility indefinitely.
20. The term "investment" is not defined in the Convention. It includes not only
equity investments of the traditional type, but new forms of association, including the
supply of services, between investors and States contributing to the economic develop-
ment of the State concerned. For examples of the type of investment disputes submitted
to ICSID, see infra text accompanying note 53; Delaume, supra note 16, at 116-20; NEWS
FROM ICSID, Summer 1984, at 18- 19.
21. Inasmuch as investment disputes are decided by arbitral tribunals and not by
ICSID as an organization, the term "jurisdiction" is somewhat inaccurate. It was never-
theless chosen "as a convenient expression to mean the limits within which the provi-
sions of the Convention will apply and the facilities of the Centre will be available for
conciliation and arbitration proceedings." Report of the Executive Directors of the Inter-
national Bank for Reconstruction and Development, reprinted in 1 INVESTMENT LAWS OF
THE WORLD (1965) [hereinafter cited as REPORT OF THE EXEcuTIVE DIREcToRS].
22. Institution Rule 6, supra note 13.
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ticularly a State) which might result from the institution of pro-
ceedings against it in a dispute which it had not consented to sub-
mit to the Centre, as well as the possibility that the machinery of
the Centre could be set in motion in cases which for other reasons
were obviously outside the jurisdiction of the Centre, e.g. because
either the applicant or the other party was not eligible to be a
party in proceedings under the Convention.23
It should be noted that the Secretary-General exercises his
screening power solely on the basis of the information supplied
by the requesting party, without eliciting at the time the view of
the other party.24
In practice, most of the requests submitted to ICSID have
been sufficiently precise and documented to enable the Secre-
tary-General to make the necessary determination quickly,
sometimes the same day as receipt of the request or within a few
days thereafter. On occasion, the Secretary-General has felt the
need to obtain additional information from the requesting party,
in order to ascertain for example, the reality of consent to ICSID
arbitration or the nationality of corporations incorporated in the
Contracting State party to the dispute but claiming to be na-
tionals of another Contracting State for the purpose of the
Convention.25
In order to appreciate the full significance of the Secretary-
General's screening power, it should be noted that a refusal on
his part to register a request would be an absolute bar to the use
of ICSID facilities, because there is no appeal from such a
decision.
In contrast, registration of a request has no bearing upon
the right of the respondent to raise objections to the jurisdiction
of an arbitral tribunal once it is constituted. In other words, re-
gistration is only one of a two-stage process, and in the second
23. REPORT OF THE EXECUTIVE DIlEcToRs supra note 21, at 20.
24. As to the practice of the International Chamber of Commerce, compare W.L.
CRAIG, W. PARK & J. PAULSSON, INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ARBITRATION
11.02 (1984). According to these authors, when the issue of consent to ICC arbitration is
considered by the ICC Court of Arbitration, the court, before deciding the matter, always
elicits a response from the defendant. Id.
25. Under article 25(2)(b) of the Convention, a locally incorporated corporation may
be regarded as a national of another Contracting State when the parties have agreed that
it should be so treated "because of foreign control." For examples, see Delaume, supra
note 16, at 111-16.
1985]
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stage the arbitral tribunal remains free to rule on its own "com-
petence,"2 including the question of whether the basic require-
ments of the Convention are satisfied. An example is found in
the Holiday Inns2 7 case, which was the first case submitted to
ICSID. The claimants, a Swiss company and a United States
corporation, and the Government of Morocco had entered into
arrangements for the construction and operation of hotels in
Morocco, through subsidiaries of the claimants incorporated in
Morocco. A dispute arose and the claimants submitted to ICSID
a request for arbitration not only in their own name, but also on
behalf of their subsidiaries. The request was registered and an
arbitral tribunal was constituted. Morocco objected to the juris-
diction of the tribunal. It argued, inter alia, that the arbitration
clause did not expressly state that the Moroccan subsidiaries
were to be treated as foreign entities because they were under
the "foreign control" of the parent companies,28 and that the na-
tionality requirement set forth in the Convention was, therefore,
not satisfied. This argument succeeded. The tribunal held that,
although it had jurisdiction in regard to the parent companies,
the subsidiaries were not entitled to participate in the
proceedings.
Similar objections, though limited in number and unsuc-
cessful, have been made in other proceedings, which with the
exception of the decision of the tribunal in Amco-Asia v. Repub-
lic of Indonesia2' have not been the object of publication.
In view of the respective consequences of the Secretary-
General's decision to register or refuse to register a request, it is
clear that the Secretary-General must exercise his screening
power with caution. This has been the ICSID tradition. In cases
that raise some doubts as to whether the basic requirements of
the Convention are fully satisfied but that are not "manifestly"
outside the jurisdiction of ICSID, the Secretary-General has felt
compelled to register the request and to leave the ultimate reso-
lution of the issue to the arbitral tribunal. However, it is note-
worthy that in circumstances such as these, the Secretary-Gen-
26. See infra notes 54-56, 78-88 and accompanying text.
27. See Lalive, supra note 6.
28. See supra note 25.
29. 23 I.L.M. 351 (1984).
[Vol. 5:563
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eral indicated at the time of registration of the request that,
even though he was not in a position to make a final ruling on
certain issues, such as those concerning the existence of con-
sent,30 or the effective nationality of the claimant,"1 he was nev-
ertheless aware that these issues might be the object of further
consideration by the arbitral tribunal.
B. Constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal
Issues regarding the constitution of ICSID arbitral tribunals
illustrate both the flexibility of the ICSID rules and the effec-
tiveness of the ICSID machinery.
In order to account for the many situations that may sur-
round arbitration proceedings, most of the provisions of the
Convention regarding the number of arbitrators and the method
for their appointment are permissive and apply only in the ab-
sence of specific agreement between the parties. The only
mandatory provisions found in the Convention are those accord-
ing to which: (i) an arbitral tribunal composed of more than a
sole arbitrator must include an uneven number of arbitrators3
2
and (ii) the majority of the arbitrators must be nationals of a
State other than the Contracting State party to the dispute or
the Contracting State whose national is a party to the dispute.3
In selecting arbitrators, the parties are free to choose per-
sons whose names appear on the Panel of Arbitrators main-
tained by ICSID34 or from outside the Panel. In practice both
30. See, e.g., SPP (Middle East) Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt Case ARB/84/3,
NEWS FROM ICSID, Winter 1985, at 3.
31. See, e.g., Maritime Int'l Nominees Establishment (MINE) v. Republic of
Guinea, Case ARB/84/4, NEWS FROM ICSID, Winter 1985, at 3.
32. Convention, supra note 1, art. 37(2).
33. Convention, supra note 1, art. 39. If both parties insist upon appointing one of
their nationals as arbitrators, the effect of this provision would be to increase the num-
ber of arbitrators (for example, to five) so that the majority of arbitrators would be na-
tionals of third countries. However, a different solution might be reached if each and
every member of the tribunal were appointed by agreement of the parties. This has hap-
pened in the case of Soci6tk Ouest Africaine des Betons Industriels (SOABI) v. the State
of S~n~gal, Case ARB/82/1, in which one arbitrator had the nationality of the claimant
(Belgian), another arbitrator was a national of the respondant State, and the President
of the tribunal was a national of a third country (The Netherlands).
34. Under article 13(1) of the Convention, each Contracting State may designate up
to four persons to the Panel of Arbitrators. Convention, supra note 1, art. 13. Out of 87
Contracting States, 52 States have made these designations.
1985]
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options have been used by the parties to ICSID proceedings.
Anticipating the possibility that one of the parties refuses to
cooperate in the appointment of arbitrators or that the parties
cannot reach agreement on the constitution of the tribunal
within a stated period of time, the Convention provides that the
Chairman of the Administrative Council shall, at the request of
either party, and after consulting both parties as far as possible,
appoint the arbitrator or arbitrators not yet appointed. 5 In
practice, the Chairman has acted as appointing authority in the
majority of ICSID proceedings either at the time of the constitu-
tion of tribunals,3" or during the proceedings, following the
death or resignation of arbitrators.3 7 Unlike the parties, the free-
dom of choice of the Chairman is limited in the sense that he
must appoint persons whose names appear on the Panel of
Arbitrators.
In this connection, it should be noted that, in making the
necessary appointments, the Chairman always endeavors to con-
sult with the parties and that in most cases the parties have co-
operated with the Chairman. In this respect, ICSID's practice
contrasts favorably with that of the other arbitration
institutions. 8
Another fact to be noted is that the Chairman has been able
to use his power of appointment to solve the difficult problem of
multipartite arbitration. This was the case in regard to three
parallel proceedings brought by foreign investors against Ja-
maica. These proceedings involved identical, though separate,
disputes concerning the imposition by Jamaica of new taxes,
contrary to the respective agreements between Jamaica and each
Under article 13(2), the Chairman of the Administrative Council may appoint up to
ten persons to the Panel. Convention, supra note 1, art. 13. Nine persons have been
appointed by the Chairman.
35. Under article 38 of the Convention, that period normally expires 90 days after
notice of the registration of the request has been dispatched by the Secretary-General.
Convention, supra note 1, art. 38. However, parties may agree, and have in several in-
stances, agreed to prolong that period.
36. This has occurred in nine arbitration proceedings.
37. This has occurred in three arbitration proceedings.
38. Under the ICC Rules, appointments are made by the ICC Court of Arbitration
upon recommendations from national committees. See W.L. CRAIG, W. PARK & J. PAUL-
SSON, supra note 24, at 12.03. See also de Hancock, The ICC Court of Arbitration, 1 J.
INT'L L. 21, 29 (1984).
[Vol. 5:563
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of the claimants. In each case, the claimants appointed the same
person as arbitrator. When Jamaica failed to appoint an arbitra-
tor, the claimants requested the Chairman to appoint, for each
proceeding, two arbitrators and to designate one of them as
President of each tribunal. The Chairman selected for this pur-
pose the same two persons to serve on each tribunal. The three
arbitrators considered each dispute and held, in respect of each
of them, that the dispute was within their competence. The dis-
putes were subsequently amicably settled.39
Whether appointed by the parties or the Chairman, an arbi-
trator must inform ICSID of any possible conflict of interest or
of any other facts that might have a bearing on his
independence.40
C. The Proceedings
1. Procedural Rules
As already noted, the rules applicable to ICSID proceedings
are truly international rules. This consideration explains why
the ICSID rules are somewhat more detailed than those of other
arbitration institutions operating to a variable extent in the con-
text of municipal law.
The ICSID rules apply, except to the extent that the parties
otherwise agree. Such an agreement may be included in the in-
strument recording the parties' consent to ICSID arbitration, or
may be concluded subsequently either before or after the insti-
tution of proceedings. In order to ascertain as early as possible
after the constitution of the tribunal the views of the parties
concerning questions of procedures, the rules wisely provide for
a preliminary procedural consultation between the President of
the tribunal and the parties.41
39. Alcoa Minerals of Jamaica/Kaiser Bauxite Company/Reynolds Jamaica Mines
and Reynolds Metals Company v. Jamaica, Cases ARB/74/2, 3 and 4. See also NEws
FROM ICSID, Summer 1984, at 13-14.
40. Arbitration Rule 6, supra note 13.
41. According to Arbitration Rule 20, the President shall, in particular, seek the
views of the parties on the following matters:
(a) the number of members of the Tribunal required to constitute a quorum
at its sittings;
(b) the language or languages to be used in the proceedings;
(c) the number and sequence of the pleadings and the time limits within
1985]
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2. The Seat of Arbitration
Because the ICSID rules are self-contained, the place of ar-
bitration does not have the significance in the context of ICSID
proceedings that it has in the case of both ad hoc and institu-
tional arbitration subject to domestic law. For the purposes of
ICSID, the place of arbitration is legally immaterial and its de-
termination is merely one of convenience.
Under article 62 of the Convention, the seat of arbitration is
normally situated in Washington, D.C., where ICSID has its
headquarters. However, pursuant to article 63 of the Convention
the parties may agree that the proceedings take place in another
location. Two situations must be distinguished. The parties are
free to decide that the proceedings may be held at the seat of
the Permanent Court of Arbitration, in The Hague, or at the
seat of any other institution with which ICSID may make appro-
priate arrangements.42 The parties may also choose any other lo-
cation, subject to obtaining the approval of the arbitral tribunal
and after consultation with the Secretary-General.4" In practice,
the location of the ICSID proceedings has been about equally
distributed between Washington, D.C. and European cities.
which they are to be filed;
(d) the number of copies desired by each party of instruments filed by the
other;
(e) dispensing with the written or the oral procedure;
(f) the manner in which the cost of the proceedings is to be apportioned; and
(g) The manner in which the record of the hearings shall be kept.
Arbitration Rule 20, supra note 13.
42. This type of arrangement has been concluded with the Asian-African Legal Con-
sultative Committee, the Regional Centre for Commercial Arbitration (in Kuala
Lumpur) and the Regional Centre for Commercial Arbitration (in Cairo). See 22 I.L.M.
522-24 (1984).
43. On occasion, the parties to ICSID clauses provide in the clause itself that the
seat of arbitration shall be located in a certain city (such as London, Paris or Geneva, or
a city in the territory of the Contracting State party to the clause). This type of provi-
sion could not be enforced as such, but is likely to be given consideration by arbitral
tribunals at the time of the preliminary procedural consultation. Arbitration Rule 20(2),
supra note 13.
[Vol. 5:563
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3. The Duration of the Proceedings; a New Initiative; The
Prehearing Conference
Statistics regarding the average duration of arbitral pro-
ceedings have little value because of the many factors that may
differentiate one proceeding from another. In this respect, IC-
SID arbitration does not differ from other forms of arbitration. 44
In the case of ICSID, however, a consideration of funda-
mental importance must be taken into account. ICSID's role is
not limited to offering a specialized machinery for dispute reso-
lution. The ultimate purpose of ICSID is to promote a climate of
mutual confidence between States and investors that is condu-
cive to an increasing flow of capital to developing countries. In
the event of a dispute, the objective of ICSID is to restore that
climate to all extent possible and to bring the parties together
with a view to encouraging amicable settlements. The fact that
more than half of the ICSID proceedings that have been closed
resulted in this type of settlement,45 shows that ICSID has been
successful in the pursuit of this objective.
With a view to increasing the effectiveness of ICSID, the
ICSID Arbitration Rules now offer a new procedure in the form
of a "prehearing conference," which may be called by the Secre-
tary-General or the President of an arbitral tribunal. The pur-
pose of such a conference is to expedite the proceedings by per-
mitting early identification of undisputed facts, thereby limiting
the proceeding to the real areas of contention.46
In a similar spirit, the Rules also give the parties the right
to request the convening of a prehearing conference between the
tribunal and the parties in the hope that it will give their au-
thorized representatives the opportunity to reach an amicable
44. See, e.g., W.L. CRAIG, W. PARK & J. PAULSSON, supra note 24 at 11.07 (regarding
ICC arbitration).
For what it is worth, the average duration of ICSID proceedings is two and a half
years.
45. See supra note 4.
46. Arbitration Rule 21(l) reads as follows:
At the request of the Secretary-General or at the discretion of the President of the
Tribunal, a prehearing conference between the Tribunal and the parties may be
held to arrange for the exchange of information and the stipulation of uncontested
facts in order to expedite the proceedings.
Arbitration Rule 21, supra note 13.
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settlement.47 Such a settlement could take the form of an agree-
ment between the parties or could be recorded in an award in
accordance with the rules.""
4. Jurisdictional Issues
Registration of a request does not prevent the parties from
raising jurisdictional objections at an early stage of the proceed-
ings. 49 This was the case in Holiday Inns,50 and in other cases,
such as Amco-Asia v. Indonesia51 and KlUckner Industrie Anla-
gen GmbH v. United Republic of Cameroon and Soci&t Camer-
ounaise des Engrais (SOCAME), 52 as well as in other cases that
have not been published.
The interesting thing is that, in all the cases so far, objec-
tions to the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals have been based on
issues relating to the reality of consent to ICSID arbitration or
on the ground that the nationality requirement set forth in arti-
cle 25(2)(b) of the Convention in regard to corporations was not
satisfied. No objection has been made on the ground that the
transaction out of which the dispute arose was not an "invest-
ment" for the purposes of the Convention, even though the
transaction involved did not always call for a capital contribu-
tion and took the form of a supply of services or a transfer of
technology.5" Under these circumstances, it seems that the par-
ties to ICSID proceedings subscribe to the view that the notion
of investment, in the context of the Convention, includes the
most modern forms of association between investors and host
States.
The arbitral tribunal is also free to consider on its own initi-
47. Arbitration Rule 21(2) reads as follows:
At the request of the parties, a prehearing conference between the Tribunal
and the parties, duly represented by their authorized representatives, may be held
to consider the issues in dispute with a view to reaching an amicable settlement.
Arbitration Rule 21, supra note 13.
48. Arbitration Rule 43, supra note 13. See Guadalupe Gas Prods. Corp. v. Federal
Military Gov't of Nig., Case ARB/78/1.
49. Arbitration Rule 41(1) provides that these objections "shall be made as early as
possible." Arbitration Rule 41(1), supra note 13.
50. See supra note 6 and text accompanying notes 27-28.
51. See NEws FROM ICSID, Summer 1984, at 5-7.
52. Id. at 7-11.
53. Delaume, supra note 16, at 116-19.
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ative and at any stage of the proceeedings "whether the dispute
or any ancillary claim before it is within the jurisdiction of the
Centre or within its own competence."64 This was done in the
proceedings concerning disputes between foreign investors and
Jamaica, and in the recent unpublished decision of an ICSID
tribunal.
In this connection, a question of terminology ought to be
clarified. Article 41(1) of the ICSID Convention provides that:
"The Tribunal shall be judge of its own competence." The
meaning of the word "competence" is twofold. It implies first
that the Tribunal must be satisfied that the dispute is within
the "jurisdiction" of ICSID, that the basic requirements of the
Convention are satisfied. It also means that the Tribunal is em-
powered to consider issues dealing with its "competence," such
as those that might concern the constitution of the Tribunal or
the issue of lis pendens, if it is alleged that the dispute falls
within the competence of another tribunal. In practice, ICSID
tribunals have experienced no difficulty in making this distinc-
tion and in segregating issues of "jurisdiction" from those relat-
ing to their "competence" in the narrow sense of that term. 6
5. The Award
The provisions of the Convention concerning the form and
content of the award are straightforward. 7 The award must: (i)
be rendered by a majority of the members of the tribunal; (ii) be
in writing and signed by the members who voted for it; (iii) deal
with every question submitted to the tribunal; and (iv) state the
reasons on which it was based. Any member may attach an indi-
vidual opinion to the award.
The award is final and binding upon the parties. Remedies
against the award are limited to revision, on the ground of newly
54. Arbitration Rule 41(2), supra note 13. See also Rule 42(4), supra note 13, relat-
ing to the situation in which a party defaults.
55. See Schmidt, supra note 6, at 96-103.
56. As to jurisdictional issues, see supra notes 19-21, 24 and accompanying text.
Regarding issues of competence, see infra notes 78-88 and accompanying text.
57. Convention, supra note 1, art. 48; Arbitration Rule 47, supra note 13. When the
award is rendered, the Secretary-General dispatches certified copies to the parties. The
date of dispatch is the date of the award. Convention, supra note 1, art. 49(1); Arbitra-
tion Rule 48, supra note 13.
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discovered facts "of such a nature as decisively to affect the
award," 18 and annulment, on specific and limited grounds. 9
Consistent with the self-contained character of the ICSID ma-
chinery, those remedies must be exercised under the auspices of
ICSID and within the framework of the Convention. In other
words, and in contrast with awards within the scope of other in-
ternational arbitration conventions,60 ICSID awards are not
open to attack on any ground (not even on the ground of public
policy) in the courts of Contracting States.
At the time of writing, an annulment proceeding (the first in
the history of ICSID) is pending. It concerns the award rendered
in Klbckner Industrie Anlagen GmbH v. United Republic of
Cameroon and Sociktg Camerounaise des Engrais (SOCAME) 1
No more can be said on this subject at this time.
6. Costs
ICSID attempts to reduce the costs of proceedings to a min-
imum. Although costs necessarily vary from case to case,6 2 IC-
58. Convention, supra note 1, art. 51.
59. Convention, supra note 1, art. 52. The grounds for annulment are:
(a) that the Tribunal was not properly constituted;
(b) that the Tribunal has manifestly exceeded its powers;
(c) that there was corruption on the part of a member of the Tribunal;
(d) that there has been a serious departure from a fundamental rule of proce-
dure; or
(e) that the award has failed to state the reasons on which it is based.
Id.
60. See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, June 10, 1958, art. V, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 38; Euro-
pean Convention or International Commercial Arbitration, Apr. 21, 1961, art. IX, 484
U.N.T.S. 364 Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, Jan.
30, 1975, art. V, OEA/Ser. A/20 (SEPF), reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 336 (1975).
61. 2 NEws ROM ICSID, Winter 1985, at 2.
62. In this connection, it may be useful to quote from an author particularly familiar
with certain ICSID proceedings:
In the three arbitration proceedings with which we are concerned, the total
amount of fees and expenses for judges equalled about 5% of the amount of the
decision in the "Benvenuti & Bonfant" case and around 1% in the "AGIP" case.
In view of the criterion for calculation indicated in the foregoing, the difference is
to be ascribed to the greater duration and complexity of the first-named dispute,
in the course of which the court of arbitration among other things had to have
recourse to an audit.
In the "Gardella" case, on the other hand, the cost of the proceeding proved
to be of the order of 5% of the value of the claim advanced by the plaintiff.
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SID arbitration is usually less expensive than arbitration con-
ducted under the auspices of other institutions. The reason for
this is not only that ICSID receives support from the World
Bank and benefits from the use of its facilities and services, but
also because ICSID makes a deliberate attempt to relate ex-
penses incurred by the parties to work effectively performed in
relation to individual proceedings. Thus, unlike arbitration insti-
tutions that require at the outset the deposit of funds calculated
to cover full administrative charges,63 ICSID's practice is to re-
quest advance payments from the parties from time to time to
cover estimated expenditures for periods of three to six
months." The amount of these advances is normally divided
equally between the parties. However, in an annulment proceed-
ing under the Revised Regulations, the applicant is solely re-
sponsible for the payment of advances. 5
Always with a view toward economy, the fees of arbitrators
are set at a stated amount per each day of work.6
ICSID also performs a number of services free of charge.
This is the case in regard to services supplied by the Secretariat
prior to the constitution of the Tribunal or those relating to the
appointment of arbitrators by the Chairman of the Administra-
tive Council.6
Translated from Bernardini, supra note 6, at 39.
63. See, e.g., W.L. CRAIG, W. PARK & J. PAULSSON, supra note 24, at 3.02-3.04
(regarding ICC arbitration).
64. Administrative and Financial Regulation 14(3)(a), supra note 13.
65. Administrative and Financial Regulation 14(3)(e), supra note 13. The rationale
for this change is twofold. First, it is intended to deter frivolous annulment applications,
which might expose the party in whose favor an award was rendered to unnecessary
additional expense. Second, the party in favor of whom the award was rendered is un-
likely to contribute to financing the costs of a procedure which, at worst, could be detri-
mental to its interests and, at best, cause it additional expense simply to confirm an
existing award.
The ultimate apportionment of costs can be determined by the ad hoc committee
constituted to review the request for annulment.
66. This amount is at present SDR 600 per day. The amount can be varied by the
Secretary-General from time to time, with the approval of the Chairman of the Adminis-
trative Council, taking into account monetary fluctuations and changes in the cost of
living. This should enable ICSID to take into account economic realities, while preserv-
ing the law costs of ICSID proceedings. See Administrative and Financial Regulation
14(1), supra note 13.
67. In the same connection, it should be noted that under the original provisions of
Administrative and Financial Regulation 25, the presence of the secretary of each Corn-
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II. The External Consequences of the ICSID Machinery:
ICSID Arbitration and the Courts
A. Judicial Restraint
1. The Rule of Judicial Abstention
From the date of consent by the parties to ICSID arbitra-
tion until the rendering of an award, ICSID arbitration is insu-
lated in all Contracting States against any form of judicial inter-
vention.8 The rationale for this rule of judicial abstention is
twofold. The Convention gives investors direct access to an in-
ternational forum and assures them that, once a Contracting
State has consented to ICSID arbitration, the refusal or absten-
tion of the State party to a dispute to participate in the proceed-
ings cannot prevent the institution, conduct, and conclusion of
the proceedings, or the recognition and enforcement of an ICSID
award.
In exchange, the Convention protects Contracting States
from other forms of foreign or international litigation. Because
consent to ICSID arbitration is equally binding upon the inves-
tor as it is on the State party to the dispute, that State is as-
sured that the investor cannot bring action in a non- ICSID ju-
risdiction, whether in the investor's own State or somewhere
else. In other words, both parties must respect the exclusive
character of ICSID remedies.
This rule is intended to maintain the careful balance be-
tween the interests of investors and those of Contracting States
that is the paramount objective of the Convention. If a court in
a Contracting State is seized of an action, which on its face
should fall within ICSID remedies, the court, in order to achieve
this objective, must stay the proceedings and refer the parties to
ICSID to seek a jurisdictional ruling. Such a ruling may be made
mission, Tribunal, and Committee was required at all hearings. Cases arose, however, in
which the parties wished to dispense with the presence of the secretary in order to save
costs. In these circumstances, there seemed to be no reason to impose upon the parties
the presence of the secretary. The requirement that the secretary attend all hearings has
therefore been deleted from Administrative and Financial Regulation 25, and his role
with regard to each individual proceeding is left to the determination of the Secretary-
General. See Administrative and Financial Regulation 25, supra note 13.
68. A Contracting State could, however, make its consent to ICSID arbitration sub-
ject to the exhaustion of local remedies. See supra note 9.
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at the time of registration of the request by the Secretary-Gen-
eral or subsequently, when issues of jurisdiction are considered
by an arbitral tribunal. Once ICSID makes its determination, ei-
ther the case will remain within ICSID's exclusive arbitration
process or, if ICSID finds that the case does not satisfy the re-
quirements of the Convention, the case may be considered by
the domestic court involved, assuming that it has an indepen-
dent basis for entertaining jurisdiction over the parties or the
subject matter of the dispute.In other words, if an action is
brought in the courts of a Contracting State contrary to an al-
leged ICSID arbitration clause, the court in which action is
brought is under an obligation to abstain from entertaining the
action unless and until ICSID has determined that it has no ju-
risdiction. This rule of abstention is essential to the proper im-
plementation of the Convention. If a court in a Contracting
State failed to observe the rule, its own State might be exposed
to international claims brought by the Contracting State party
to the dispute or whose national is a party to the dispute.6'
These are considerations that were brought to the attention
of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
by the United States Government in Maritime International
Nominees Establishment v. Guinea.70 The court of appeals de-
cided the case on another basis, namely the U.S. Foreign Sover-
eign Immunities Act (FSIA).71 The court was of the opinion
that, although consent to arbitration might constitute a waiver
of immunity under the FSIA, no such waiver could be inferred
from a consent to ICSID arbitration because American courts
were "powerless to compel ICSID arbitration." Under the cir-
69. Article 64 of the Convention provides that: "Any dispute between Contracting
States concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention which is not set-
tled by negotiation shall be referred to the International Court of Justice by application
of any party to such dispute, unless the States concerned agree to another method of
settlement." Convention, supra note 1, art. 64. Because this rule of abstention is directly
relevant to the "interpretation" or "application" of the Convention, failure by a domestic
court to comply with the rule might expose its own state to the type of international
claim that is referred to in article 64.
70. 693 F.2d 1094 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 71 (1983), reprinted in 21
I.L.M. 1355 (as amended 22 I.L.M. 86 (1983)). See Delaume, ICSID Arbitration and the
Courts, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 784 (1983) (gives a number of illustrations of situations in
which the rule of abstention should be observed).
71. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 2891 (1976) (codified at 28
U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a)(2)-(4), 1391(f), 1441(d) and 1602-1611).
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cumstances, the court held that by consenting to ICSID arbitra-
tion, Guinea had not waived its immunity for the purpose of the
FSIA and that the court should decline jurisdiction.
This decision reaches the right result, but is based on con-
siderations found in the domestic law of the forum, the FSIA. It
should have been based instead on grounds consistent with the
purposes of the Convention and the exclusive character of IC-
SID arbitration. This is the solution that has recently prevailed
in the French courts in attachment proceedings that now de-
serve consideration.
2. Provisional Measures (Interim Measures of Protection)
Under the Convention, the only provisional or interim mea-
sures of protection to which the parties may be entitled are
those that can be recommended by an arbitral tribunal on its
own initiative or upon the parties' request.72 In other words, by
consenting to ICSID arbitration, the parties waive their right to
seek interim measures of protection, including attachment in do-
mestic courts, whether before or after the institution of ICSID
proceedings. In this respect, the ICSID rules differ from those of
other arbitration institutions, according to which requests for in-
terim measures addressed to a judicial authority are not deemed
incompatible with the arbitration agreement.3
In the context of ICSID, if the parties wish to retain the
option to seek judicial assistance with respect to provisional
measures, they must do so by way of an express provision in the
agreement recording their consent. Examples of such provisions
are found primarily in financial agreements between bankers
and foreign governmental borrowers,7" and in the Model Clauses
published by ICSID 5
72. Convention, supra note 1, art. 47; Arbitration Rule 39, supra note 13.
73. See, e.g., Rules for the ICC Court of Arbitration, ICC Publication No. 291, art. 8
(5) (1980); W.L. CRAIG, W. PARK & J. PAULSSON, supra note 24, at 27.01-.04; Commer-
cial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association, Feb. 1, 1984, § 46; UNCI-
TRAL Arbitration Rules, art. 26(3), UNCITRAL, Report of the Ninth Session, [1976] 7
Y.B. COMM'N INT'L TRADE L. 22, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SER.A/1976, reprinted in 2 Y.B. CoM.
APB. 161 (ICCA 1977). See also 2 G. DELAUME, supra note 9, § 13.14.
74. See generally 2 G. DELAUME, supra note 9, § 15.18.
75. Model Clause XVI reads as follows:
The consent to arbitration recorded in [identify the Basic Clause] shall not
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In the absence of such an agreement, the exclusive character
of ICSID arbitration requires the courts in Contracting States,
consistent with the rule of abstention, to refuse judicial assis-
tance to the party seeking provisional measures. Republique
Populaire R~volutionnaire de Guinke v. Socit Atlantic Tri-
ton 76 a French decision, illustrates the rule. In that case, Atlan-
tic Triton and Guinea had entered into a contract for the con-
version of vessels into fishing vessels and for the training of
crews. The contract provided for ICSID arbitration and Atlantic
Triton submitted a request for the institution of arbitration pro-
ceedings to the Secretary-General. The request was registered on
January 15, 1984, 7 and the ICSID arbitral tribunal was consti-
tuted on August 1, 1984.78
On October 12, 1983, before the submission of the request to
ICSID, Atlantic Triton obtained an order of attachment from a
French commercial court concerning three Guinean vessels
under repair in a French port. The order was confirmed on April
6, 1984, after registration of the request by the Secretary-Gen-
eral. On appeal, the Court of Appeal vacated the attachment on
the ground that, the arbitral tribunal had "general and exclusive
competence to decide not only in regard to the merits, but also
in respect of any provisional measures" and that consequently,
the French courts had no jurisdiction in the matter. This,
clearly, is the correct solution.
In this connection, reference should also be made to the
Holiday Inns79 case. It should be recalled that this case involved
arrangements for the construction of hotels in Morocco by the
Holiday Inns Group. Because of alleged acts of Morocco, H.I.
Group stopped construction of two hotels. In 1972, after the re-
gistration of the request for ICSID arbitration, the Government
of Morocco obtained orders from the Moroccan courts authoriz-
preclude any party hereto from taking, or requesting any judicial or other author-
ity to order, any provisional or conservatory measure, including attachment, prior
to the institution of the proceeding or during the proceeding, for the preservation
of its rights and interests.
76. Judgment of Oct. 26, 1984, Cour d'appel Rennes (unpublished decision). It will
appear in English translation in a forthcoming issue of International Legal Materials.
77. NEws FROM ICSID, Winter 1985, at 2.
78. Id. at 3.
79. See supra text accompanying notes 27-28.
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ing it to take all necessary measures to have construction re-
sumed and completed at H.I. costs. The courts also appointed a
judicial administrator.
In the ICSID proceedings, the claimants argued that the
unilateral action of the government was contrary not only to the
terms of the Basic Agreement between them, but also to the ex-
clusive character of ICSID arbitration. The government took the
position that the Moroccan courts had exclusive jurisdiction re-
garding provisional measures and that such measures in effect
"assured the protection of the interests of both parties pendente
lite."
In a strongly worded decision, the arbitral tribunal reaf-
firmed the general principle that
[t]he Parties are under an obligation to abstain from all measures
likely to prevent definitely the execution of their obligation.
The Tribunal therefore considers that it has jurisdiction to
recommend provisional measures according to the terms of Arti-
cle 47 of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Dis-
putes between States and Nationals of Other States, the Parties
still having the right to express, in the rest of the procedure, any
exception relating to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal on any other
aspect of the dispute[,] s0
and made a number of recommendations to the parties."1
This decision is interesting because it illustrates the point
that the Tribunal rendered its decision prior to ascertaining its
jurisdiction to deal with the merits. This is an issue which has
confronted other international tribunals and is still the object of
80. Lalive, supra note 6, at 136 (quoting the decision of the arbitral tribunal).
81. "Both parties are invited to abstain from any measure incompatible with the
upholding of the Contract and to make sure that the action already taken should not
result in any consequences in the future which would go against such upholding." Id. at
137.
According to Lalive:
A second recommendation, formulated in a carefully balanced manner, con-
cerns the exchange of information by the parties regarding the management of the
completed hotels and the completion of those hotels still to be constructed. In a
third and last recommendation, the Tribunal, taking special account of one of the
claimants' complaints, recommended consultations "in order to maintain in the
hotels the character of the enterprise which is part of the international chain of
Holiday Inns Hotels."
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controversy. 2
In the case of ICSID, unlike in that of other tribunals, the
issue arises in a special context. Before it reaches an ICSID tri-
bunal, the request must have been screened by the Secretary-
General. Registration of a request constitutes, therefore, prima
facie evidence that, in the opinion of the Secretary-General the
dispute is not "manifestly" outside the jurisdiction of ICSID or,
as that term is used in article 41(1) of the Convention, "the com-
petence" of the tribunal. To be sure, the Tribunal is not bound
by the Secretary-General's decision.83 Nevertheless, that deci-
sion cannot but weigh in favor of the Tribunal's power to rule at
an early stage of the proceedings on provisional measures, which
incidentally, have not often been requested. 4
3. Lis pendens
Another issue, which arose in the Holiday Inns case, also
deserves attention. The Basic Agreement between Morocco and
the H.I. Group provided that Morocco undertook to lend funds
to the H.I. Group in the form of mortgage loans made by Moroc-
can financial institutions. Disbursement of these loans were.
stopped presumably on the government's instruction. The claim-
ants included their grievances in regard to these loans in the dis-
82. See, e.g., SHIHATA, THE POWER OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT TO DETERMiNE rrs
OWN JURISDICTION 170-80 (1965); Mendelson, Interim Measures of Protection in Cases of
Contested Jurisdiction, 46 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 259 (1975); V.S. MANI, INTERNATIONAL AD-
JUDICATION 276-318 (1980).
83. This point was made in another decision of the tribunal in the Holiday Inns
case in which the Tribunal stated: "The registration of the Request by the Secretary-
General shows and only shows that the Request was not in his view manifestly outside
the jurisdiction of the Centre" and that such registration did "not of course preclude a
finding by the Tribunal that the dispute is outside the jurisdiction of the Centre."
Lalive, supra note 6, at 144 n.2 (quoting the decision of the arbitral tribunal).
For an interesting history of the ICSID Convention and a comparison with other
international tribunals, see Masood, Provisional Measures of Protection in Arbitration
under the World Bank Convention, 1 DELHI L. REv. 138 (1972).
84. One request was granted in the case of AGIP v. Congo in which the respondent
had taken custody of corporate documents of the claimant and the tribunal recom-
mended that the documents should be preserved, a complete list be sent to the tribunal
and the plaintiff, and that these documents be produced to the tribunal at the request of
the claimant. This decision is summarized by Bernardini, supra note 6, at 35.
In the proceedings relating to the dispute between Atlantic Triton and Guinea, the
issue became moot following the revocation of the order of attachment by the Cour
d'appel Rennes. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
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pute submitted to the ICSID arbitral tribunal. The government
objected that the Moroccan courts had sole jurisdiction because
the loans had been made to the Moroccan subsidiaries of the
claimants (which as decided by the Tribunal were not eligible to
be parties to ICSID proceedings) 5 by Moroccan institutions
(and not by the government), and the loan contracts provided
for the jurisdiction of the Moroccan courts. Also the government
contended that, although the Basic Agreement provided that it
"will lend" moneys to the H.I. Group this provision meant only
that it would facilitate or cause loan contracts to be made and
that, following the making of these contracts, its obligation was
discharged. The Tribunal refused to accept this interpretation.
It held also that the loans were a means to implement the Basic
Agreement, an international contract, and had a subordinate
character. Said the Tribunal:
It is well known, and it is being particularly shown in the
present case, that investment is accomplished by a number of ju-
ridical acts of all sorts. It would not be consonant either with eco-
nomic reality or with the intention of the parties to consider each
of these acts in complete isolation from the others. It is particu-
larly important to ascertain which is the act which is the basis of
the investment and which entails as measures of execution the
other acts which have been concluded in order to carry it out.8
Under the circumstances, the Tribunal found it necessary to
segregate issues that related directly to the investment from
other "indirect or secondary aspects" of the loan contracts,
which might concern the relations between the lenders and the
borrowing companies. In the event that both the Tribunal and
the local courts within the scope of their respective jurisdiction,
would be faced with the same type of issues, the Tribunal made
it clear that:
In such a hypothetical situation the Moroccan tribunals
should refrain from making decisions until the Arbitral Tribunal
has decided these questions or, if the Tribunal had already de-
cided them, the Moroccan tribunals should follow its opinion.
Any other solution would, or might, put in issue the responsibility
of the Moroccan State and would endanger the rule that interna-
85. See supra text accompanying notes 27-28.
86. Lalive, supra note 6, at 139 (quoting the decision of the arbitral tribunal).
[Vol. 5:563
24http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol5/iss3/2
ICSID ARBITRATION
tional proceedings prevail over internal proceedings."
A plea of lis pendens was also raised in the case of Benve-
nuti Bonfant v. Congo."' In that case, the respondent filed objec-
tions to the "competence" of the Tribunal on the ground that a
suit was pending before a Congolese court. The plea did not suc-
ceed because the Tribunal found that there was no identity be-
tween the parties to the ICSID and the Congolese proceedings
and that the subject matter of the two disputes was not the
same.
8 9
B. Judicial Assistance
In view of the general literature dealing with the recognition
and enforcement of ICSID arbitral awards9" and of articles deal-
ing with specific issues that arose in that context,9 the type of
assistance that domestic courts can be expected to give to the
ICSID machinery can be summarized briefly.
1. Recognition of ISCID Awards
Article 54(1) of the Convention provides that each Con-
tracting State shall recognize an ICSID award and enforce the
pecuniary obligations imposed by that award as if it were a final
judgment of a court in the recognizing State.2
The procedure for the recognition and enforcement of IC-
SID awards is made as simple as possible. Under article 54(2) of
the Convention any party to an ICSID award may obtain recog-
nition and enforcement of the award by furnishing to the com-
87. Id. at 160.
88. 21 I.L.M. 740 (1982), with a correction in 21 I.L.M. 1478 (1984).
89. See 11.13-1.16 of the award, 21 I.L.M. 740, 744-45 (1982).
90. See the bibliography prepared by the Secretariat and issued as Document IC-
SID/13.
91. Delaume, supra note 70, at 796-803; Giardina, L'Execution des Sentences du
Centre International pour le Rglement des diffrends Relatifs aux Investissements,
1982 REVUE CRITIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRivA at 273.
92. A Contracting State with a federal constitution may enforce such an award in or
through its federal courts and may provide that such courts shall treat the award as if it
were a final judgment of the courts of a constituent State. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 1650a(a)
(1982) (in regard to the United States). As to the problems which might arise under that
provision, see Coil, United States Enforcement of Arbitral Awards Against Sovereign
States: Implications of the ICSID Convention, 17 HARV. INT'L L.J. 401, 410-13 (1976).
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petent court or other authority designated for the purpose by
each Contracting State, a certified copy of the award. An illus-
tration of the effectiveness of this procedure is found in a
French decision giving recognition to the award rendered in the
case of Benvenuti & Bonfant v. Congo,93 in which the court said
that:
[The] provisions [of the ICSID Convention] offer a simplified
procedure for recognition and enforcement (exequatur simplifie)
and restrict the function of the court designated for the purposes
of the Convention by each Contracting State to ascertaining the
authenticity of the award certified by the Secretary General of
the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes.
This decision is the only one rendered so far. Following recogni-
tion of the award, the Government of the Congo complied with
it.94
2. Enforcement of ICSID awards and sovereign immunity
Once it is recognized, an ICSID award becomes an execu-
tory title. As such it could be enforced readily against an inves-
tor, if the investor refused to comply with the terms of the
award. The situation might be different if the State party to the
dispute refused to comply with the award. The reason is that the
ICSID Convention does not derogate from the rules of immunity
from execution that may prevail in each Contracting State.95
Under the circumstances, it is possible that ICSID awards be
capable of execution against the assets of the State (or of one of
its "subdivisions" or "agencies") party to the dispute in certain
Contracting States and not in other Contracting States.9"
This is an issue that has been the subject of much scholarly
discussion, but which in practice has not arisen, and is unlikely
to arise. First, reliance by the State in question upon its immu-
nity from execution would be contrary to its obligation under
the Convention to comply with the award and it would expose
93. Judgment of June 26, 1981, Cour d'appel, Paris, S.A.R.L. Benvenuti & Bonfant
v. Republique Populaire du Congo, Journal du Droit International 1981, 843, reproduced
in English translation in 20 I.L.M. 878 (1981).
94. NEWS FROM ICSID Winter 1984, at 2.
95. Convention, supra note 1, art. 55.
96. G. DELAUME, supra note 9, §§ 12.01-.06 (Supp. 1982).
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that State to various sanctions set forth in the Convention.9 7
Second, and possibly more important than considerations of a
strictly legal nature, refusal by the State involved to comply
with an ICSID award would deprive it of credibility in the inter-
national community." This is not a risk that a State would be
likely to assume lightly.
III. Conclusion
This survey of some salient features of the ICSID machin-
ery speaks well for the effectiveness of the institution. New ini-
tiatives, such as the pre- hearing conference now available under
the Arbitration Rules should facilitate the process of dispute
resolution and lead to an increasing number of amicable settle-
ments, consistent with the ultimate objective of ICSID.
Another encouraging factor is the fact that, unlike in the
case of well known international proceedings in which the State
involved elected to default,9 the history of ICSID shows a high
degree of State participation in the proceedings. Although only
one State has acted as claimant, the States against which pro-
ceedings have been instituted have often presented their own
grievances in the form of counterclaims that insure them of hav-
ing a full day in court. This consideration is of direct interest to
the effectiveness of ICSID awards. To the extent that counter-
claims have been successful, which has been the case in certain
instances, the problem of the enforcement of ICSID awards has
simply disappeared. In the other instances, in which awards
were rendered against a State, the State's participation in the
proceedings has certainly been a contributing factor to its will-
ingness to comply with the award or to reach an ultimate settle-
ment with the claimant.
97. This includes the resumption of diplomatic protection, see supra note 10, and
the right of the State whose national was party to the dispute to bring an international
claim against the non-complying State. Convention, supra note 1, art. 64. See Delaume,
supra note 90, at 801-02.
98. See, e.g., Sapphire Int'l Petroleum Ltd. v. National Iranian Oil Co., award of
March 15, 1963, 35 I.L.R. 136, 170; Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company/California Asi-
atic Oil Co. and the Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, award of October 10,
1973, 53 I.L.R. 297, 311 (1979); Libyan Am. Oil, Co. (LIAMCO) v. Libyan Arab Republic,
20 I.L.M. 1, 78 (1981).
99. Gabon v. Socit Serete S.A., Case ARB/76/1.
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